ASUR AREA VASTA No.3 ZT9 – Hospital Complex in San Severino Marche
The structure in question required a moderate quantity of primary energy throughout the year to fulfil various types of energy requirements, including heating, refrigeration and electricity. In particular, heating was produced by three hot water generators equipped with gas burners, two of which were outdated and inefficient, as was the fourth steam boiler. This meant high fuel consumption to produce the necessary heating to guarantee the correct environmental comfort during the months in which the heating system was in use, and generally throughout the year as the boilers also operated in summer. Furthermore, the two carbo-fuel boilers and the steam boiler, although in working order, could not guarantee an appropriate useful life and furthermore were not environmentally and ecologically very reliable. The boiler technology dated back to the early 90s, when environmental pollution was not of prime importance in the design of heat generators. The modest production performance (i.e. the ratio between the energy provided for the liquid heat transfer and the energy for the heating system) also had an impact on fuel consumption and pollution emissions. With the exception of the new refrigerated water circuits, all the plant engineering in the sub-station was obsolete, as were the three boilers. Boiler maintenance and servicing was poor, insulation was incomplete and incorrectly installed, so it was unable to guarantee adequate performance. The maintenance and servicing of the control valves was not compliant. The electrical control panels of the power plant and sub-station were outdated and inadequate, due to the precarious conditions of the protective equipment. Thus, the systems clearly did not comply with current legislation. In the event of a fault, there would have been a high risk that a widespread interruption would have occurred to numerous activities, as the various circuits were all linked to just a few protective switches. The control panels were roughly divided into a light circuit and a utility power circuit and the switches showed the following failures:
- lack of protection against indirect contact;
- lack of line protection coordination;
- lack of selectivity between upstream and downstream protective devices;
- outdated protective devices and, therefore, the possibility that in the event of a fault, the protective switch would not trigger, with subsequent risk of damage to the electrical control panel or worse still, to the system.